This paper examines the structure of moral responsibility for outcomes. We apply game theory to model the anatomy of such responsibility. A central feature of this anatomy is a formal condition that we term the 'avoidance potential', which gives precision to the idea that moral responsibility implies a reasonable demand that an agent should have acted otherwise. We show how this theory can allocate moral responsibility to individuals in complex collective actions problems, an issue that sometimes goes by the name of 'the problem of many hands'. We also show how this theory allocates moral responsibility in the classic Frankfurt style example. The paper closes with a brief indication of the implications of the theory for moral obligations.
Introduction
Judgements of moral responsibility for the realization of a state of affairs are intimately connected to the relationship between an agent's behaviour and the state of affairs involved. Roughly speaking, a theory of moral responsibility for outcomes selects a subset of agents deemed to be appropriate candidates for moral appraisal (blame or praise) and/or sanctions (punishment or reward) on the basis of there being a significant connection between their actions and the state of affairs in question. However, in a broad class of situations -political ones in particular -many different agents contribute in a variety of ways to a particular decision or policy, so ascertaining who is to be held responsible will often be difficult. This has become known as 'the problem of many hands' (Thompson 1980) . A theory of moral responsibility should be able to disentangle the various individual contributions, but this is clearly a notoriously complex problem.
There are many generic examples that demonstrate the difficulty of assigning responsibility in cases of complex joint action. 1 A particularly prominent case is that of the 'Tragedy of the Commons' (Hardin 1968) . The 'tragedy' is one in which a group of independent and economically interested and active agents derive benefits from a subtractable resource but drive that resource to complete depletion to the detriment of all the users. In the narrative of the commons, and in collective action problems in general, no individual has direct control over the outcome in the form of actions that are necessary or sufficient conditions for such an outcome to occur. In such cases it is not obvious who is to be assigned responsibility for the outcome. To illustrate the high stakes involved, consider the issue of whether moral obligations regarding global warming devolve upon individual people, given that global warming can be traced back to countless day-to-day individual decisions. As many have done, we can describe this situation as a Tragedy of the Commons. 2 In this case the 'commons' is the climate and in one version suggested by Johnson (2003) and Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) , the actions involved are, for instance, taking a spin in a gas-guzzling sport utility vehicle (SUV) or not; the outcomes are the many effects, including increased level of carbon dioxide emissions, climate change, and eventual destruction of ecologically sensitive habitats. If we can pin responsibility on Sunday pleasure drivers, at least prima facie, an effective policy for the alleviation of global warming should include educative measures that effect changes in the attitudes of the individuals involved. On the other hand, if, as both Johnson and Sinnott-Armstrong believe, such drivers cannot be held responsible for global warning, then any such measures would be unjust in the sense that they place undeserved moral burdens on individuals.
One way of pinning down responsibility in complex interactions is to adopt the concept of collective responsibility. This is the idea that a group per se can be charged with moral responsibility which then descends to the constituent members of the group by dint of some criterion such as 'mere membership', 'shared values', 'being a beneficiary' etc. 3 The problem with this approach is, first, that it is beset with taxing metaphysical and normative quandaries: the hypostatization of groups is anything but straightforward; 4 and the problem of membership criteria is, as Lewis (1948) observed some time ago, that this form of responsibility may implicate each of us in one another's actions, so praise and blame will then fall on us without discrimination. Furthermore, in some situations it may be very difficult to relate the collective outcome to individual responsibilities. Indeed, in a recent, important paper, Pettit (2007) argued that circumstances exist in which a collective agent is responsible for the realization of some state of affairs although none of the individuals constituting the collective agent is. He christens this the 'problem of no hands' and considers it to be a major moral and practical problem because if such 'responsibility gaps' exist, then the members of the group have an incentive to organize their activities in a self-serving way while at the same time being able to avoid any responsibility in the event that harm occurs (Pettit 2007: 197) .
Our objective in this paper is ambitious: we set out to construct the necessary and sufficient conditions for assigning moral responsibility to individuals in complex decision situations. The analysis can be called formal according to two meanings of the word. First, it is formal in the sense that we formulate and analyze our account of responsibility in a formal framework, viz., that of game theory. The advantage of doing so is that we can adumbrate a set of conditions that more or less define an algorithm for cutting through the thicket of concepts and examples that characterize the analysis of moral responsibility in general and cases of joint actions in particular. Secondly, it is formal in the sense that it abstractly describes the different ingredients of our theory of responsibility. We do not aim to present a theory of moral responsibility that can be directly applied to particular real-world cases, but rather to present a rigorous formulation of what we deem to be the essential ingredients of any such theory. It is for this reason that we say that we present an 'anatomy' of moral responsibility.
Such an anatomy should presuppose some normative stance, however general, about when it is appropriate to hold a person responsible. Our starting point is what we take to be the view of 'folk ethics' on moral responsibility. 5 On this view, two conditions have to be fulfilled before we can hold an agent responsible for some particular outcome. According to what we may call the Causal Relevancy Condition (CRC), there should be a causal relation between the action of the agent and the outcome: responsibility is taken to imply causation. The second condition, which we may refer to as the Avoidance Condition (AC), states that the agent should have had reasonable opportunity to do otherwise. While these two conditions have an obvious, intuitive appeal, the extensive philosophical discussions of moral responsibility show they are not as innocuous as they may seem. 6 We will not, however, try to defend here these conditions against other normative views of moral responsibility. The primary focus of this paper is to show how they can be made more precise and how this yields a general solution to the problem of allocating such responsibility.
The main argument of the paper is thus constructive: the general framework that we provide -the 'anatomy' -can be seen as a result in itself. Two important limitations of the analysis should, though, be mentioned. Both CRC and AC are, we claim, necessary conditions for bearing moral responsibility. They do not comprise sufficient conditions, not even in combination. First of all, not just any kind of behaviour is a relevant event for moral responsibility. We take an 'action' or 'omission' to be more than just an arbitrary item of behaviour (such as a bodily movement) or its absence thereof. In order to ground responsibility a behaviour must have a volitional quality in the sense that its genesis is from some form of autonomous intentionality. Our first limitation is that we simply assume that the actions we analyze do indeed have this quality; that is, the individuals in our analysis are assumed to have a capacity to reflect on their beliefs and desires and exercise some form of control over what they do, or refrain from doing: they are 'reason-responsive' and 'planning agents' in the required sense. A second issue that we ignore concerns the special problem constituted by incomplete information on the part of the agents. If an agent knew, could have known, or should have known, that a certain action of hers could lead to a particular outcome, then we shall assess her responsibility for the outcome differently than if she could not possibly have known, or need not have known, that the outcome would have resulted. We ignore these issues by restricting ourselves to situations in which individuals have complete information. That is, they know the actions and omissions available to them and to others, and also know which outcomes follow from which particular combinations of actions. The only information they do not have pertains to what the other agents will do and since the consequences of an agent's actions depend in part on those other actions, the individuals are often ignorant about the exact consequences of their action.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce and expound upon the basic game theoretic concepts that we will use. Drawing on Braham and van Hees (2009) , we introduce and summarise the conception of causal contribution that constitutes the first central component of our account in Section 3. Here we adopt the so-called 'NESS test' as a general account of singular (or actual) causation, and provide it with a game-theoretic formulation. In Section 4 we operationalize the second key component of our theory of moral responsibility: the avoidance potential ; and in Section 5 we complete our anatomy in full. In Section 6 we apply our formal theory to the analysis of the Tragedy of the Commons and Pettit's (2007) arguments for the possibility of responsibility gaps. Finally, in Section 7 we analyze Frankfurt's seminal argument against the assumption that moral responsibility presupposes the existence of an alternative course of action. We show that our analysis supports the conclusion that a person can be morally responsible for the realization of a state of affairs, even if there was no course of action available to him that would have led to a different outcome. However, our justification of this conclusion is new: on our account the important consideration is not whether a person could have realized a different outcome but whether he could have avoided making a causal contribution to it. We close with some concluding remarks in Section 8.
The Formal Framework
The elementary concept that we need throughout is that of a game. Very generally, a game specifies the 'rules of the game', which define precisely who can do what, when, and to what effect, as well as the individuals' preferences regarding the various outcomes. We use the information provided by a game as the basis of responsibility assignments. Formally, a game G is an n+4-tuple (N, X, S 1 , . . . , S n , π, R n ), where (1) N (with cardinality n) is a finite set of agents (players); (2) X a finite set of outcomes; (3) for each i ∈ N , S i is a finite set of possible strategies; (4) π is an an outcome function from the set of all strategy combinations × i∈N S i , or plays, onto X (π being onto X means each element of X is an outcome in at least one play, with a play being denoted by a strategy profile s N = (s 1 , . . . , s n )); and (5) R n is a preference profile, that is, an n-tuple of preference orderings (one for each individual) over X.
The elements of the set X are taken to be social states, viz., detailed descriptions of the world. While the elements of X are called outcomes, the (non-empty) subsets A ⊆ X are called states of affairs. A state of affairs describes one or more aspects of an outcome. Thus, whereas x may, for instance, be the outcome in which Bob is elected to be the new leader of the labour union, A may represent the state of affairs in which a male person is elected to be the new leader and B the set of outcomes in which no new leader is chosen, etc. States of affairs are described extensionally. Hence, we have x ∈ A and A ∩ B = ∅. 7 The distinction between states of affairs and outcome is important. A person may be responsible for an outcome without being so for all of its aspects (I may be responsible for Bob being elected but I need not be so for the fact that a man is elected, as there may have been no female candidates on the ballot); conversely, one may be responsible for a state of affairs without being so for the outcome (I may be responsible for the election of a male candidate -perhaps because I vetoed all female candidates -without being so for Bob's election).
A strategy is a course of action available to the agent. Generally speaking a strategy is a 'bundle' or 'complex of actions'. For instance, the strategy 'shoot' consists of all those physical events that result in a 'shooting', such as picking up a gun, aiming, curling a finger around the trigger, etc. A game treats 'omissions' as strategies. A strategy of 'not shooting', for instance, is any set of actions that does not contain certain actions that are necessary for 'shooting'. Omissions are not therefore, in Lewis's (2004) language, 'absences' that cannot be considered causal relata 'by reason of their nonexistence'.
Finally, the outcome function π assigns a particular outcome to each combination of strategies. The function is completely abstract: it may be determined by empirically ascertainable 'laws of nature', such as the strength required, say, to lift a fallen tree that has trapped a person; or it may be a matter of social law and convention, such as a decision rule that determines who has the authority to do so certain things. In any case it can be a statement of certain regularities, generated either 'naturally' or 'conventionally'.
In itself, a specification of the players, their strategies, the outcomes, and the outcome function does not give us information about what the agents will do. For that purpose game theorists also specify the preferences of the individuals and use a solution concept, which is an assumption about how rational individuals will act given the rules of the game and their preferences. The existence of a preference profile expresses the assumption that agents are able to give a consistent ordering of their wants, desires, needs, and interests. A solution concept specifies how rational individuals will play the game: it consists of a subset of plays.
For our purposes it is important not only to know what the agents will do given the game as described and the assumption of individual rationality in place, but also what would happen if a player were to adopt a strategy that is not rationalizable. For this reason, we assume that for each player i and each strategy s i available to her, we can assign a probability distribution over the plays in which i performs s i . We do not discuss the precise nature of these probability distributions, the possible logical relations between them, or the way they can be derived from a solution concept; we only assume that such probability functions are given. 8 However, we do make one assumption, which is that for any s i , the probability that the others will play s −i if i plays s i equals 1 if each strategy in s −i is strictly dominant. 9 Before we proceed, it is important to point out that the specification of the relevant game is not an innocuous choice. To see this, consider Beebee's (2004) 'Queen of England Problem'. Suppose Bob promised to water Joan's plant but for some reason failed to do so with the consequence that the plant died. To model this situation it is reasonable to focus on a game in which Bob and Joan are the only players. Now suppose we derive the judgement that Bob caused the plant's death. It may well be the case that on the theory of causation yielding that judgement we would also have to infer that the Queen of England's failure to water the plant is a cause of the plant's death: the reasoning that led to the judgement that Bob's omission is a causal factor may also apply to the Queen's omission. 10 However, the Queen is not assumed to be part of the game and thus the way a game is defined already selects the relevant individuals whose behaviour is to be appraised.
In the context of Mackie's (1965; theory of causation, which we adopt, the ingredients of the analysis are what he calls the 'causal field'. 11 This notion presupposes knowledge of which part of the causal chain that led to some action is relevant for the assessment of a person's causal contribution and which part is not. In the 'Queen of England Problem', Bob's action is taken to be part of the causal field, whereas the Queen's omission is not. Given that we are developing an account of moral responsibility, we could say that the game not only specifies the 'causal field' but also the 'moral field'; the game contains all of the normatively relevant information.
To give another example of the relevance of which game we take to analyze responsibility, suppose we want to determine which members of a voting committee are to be held responsible for a decision they made. If we restrict our attention only to the actual decision, then the game will only describe the situation at the time of the actual vote: the given set of players, the voting rule, the various outcomes to which the different combinations of votes would have led, and the actual outcome. Given this restricted information, we may come to the conclusion that some member of the committee can be exonerated because, say, she voted against the eventual outcome. However, if we extend the game by incorporating information about, for instance, how the committee came into being in the first place, that committee member may well be responsible after all -perhaps because if she had not agreed to join the committee the vote may not have been taken in the first place.
Taking some specific game as the starting point of the analysis, that is, presupposing a 'moral field', does not make the analysis arbitrary. First of all, we are often interested in assigning responsibility in well-defined and specific contexts, such as when we want to know who is responsible for a specific committee decision, insofar as that responsibility can be traced back to the decision-making process within the committee. In these cases, the research question at least in part determines the moral field. Secondly, the relevance of the moral field points out that assignments of moral responsibility are partly determined by our prior moral expectations: there is, we assume, no normatively neutral way of arriving at such judgements. This means that the choice of the game should be carefully justified; it does not mean that such justification is impossible. 12
Making a Causal Contribution
In order to ascribe moral responsibility for some state of affairs to an individual we must precisely parse her causal connection to that state of affairs. Two remarks are necessary before we begin. First, although we use the term 'causation' or ' causal efficacy', we are aware that on occasion it would be more precise to use the expressions 'contributory effect', 'conventional causality', or 'conventional generation' because the term 'causality' generally refers to the connection between two events that are related by some 'regularity' or 'law of nature'. The cases that we focus on are governed by legal norms and social conventions and not merely by laws of nature as such. For instance, that a house burns down following the outbreak of a fire of a certain size and intensity follows from the regularities that we call 'laws of nature'; that a particular policy is implemented following the agreement of a given set of people follows from legal rules and conventions. That is, the states of affairs in our examples may not be nomically related to their 'causes'. 13 To adopt this other terminology would, however, burden the discussion without adding anything. In fact, we need not do so since we are primarily concerned with causation for particular or singular events (or 'causes in fact' in legal terminology). 14 The conception of a cause that we adopt, but do not defend, is that of difference-making. In Lewis's (1973: 557) paraphrase of Hume: 'We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a difference from what would have been. ' We assume, as is general in legal theory (especially in tort law), that a cause is a relation of dependency to be understood in terms of necessary or sufficient conditions (Honoré 1995) . In particular, we assume that it is a form of dependence that subordinates a criterion of necessity to that of sufficiency and replaces the idea of identifying some event as 'the cause' with that of a 'causally relevant factor'. This conception ascribes C causal status for E if it satisfies the following criterion, known as the NESS test (Wright 1988 (Wright : 1020 :
There is a set of sufficient conditions for E such that: (1) C is a member of the set; (2) all elements of the set obtain; (3) C is necessary for the sufficiency of the set. 15
In words: C is a causal condition for E if C is a necessary element of a sufficient set of conditions for E. Or, somewhat more precisely, C is part of a set of conditions that are together sufficient for E and is necessary for that set of conditions to be sufficient for E. In the case in which all elements of the set are necessary for the sufficiency of the set, we call such a set a minimal sufficient condition for E. 16 For our purposes it is helpful to note here that the NESS test readily accounts for cases of causal overdetermination. The reason for this is that an event is attributed causal status even if, due to the presence of other actually or hypothetically sufficient sets, it was not necessary for the result in the relevant circumstances. To see how this works, suppose three individuals are walking in the woods and they come across an injured jogger trapped under a fallen tree trunk. It takes at least two to lift the trunk and rescue the jogger but as it happens all three do the lifting. There are three possible sets of actions that are minimally sufficient for the rescue and each rescuer belongs to at least one (in fact two) of these. Consequently, each of the rescuers' actions can be attributed causal status. 17 To formulate this notion of causality in game-theoretic terms we need to introduce some additional notation. First, for all T ⊆ N , we call an element s T of Π i∈T S i a T -event: it drinking of a gallon of wine was a cause of his drunkenness' is a statement of singular causation. In contrast, 'drinking a gallon of wine causes drunkenness' is a general statement and implies a covering law.
15 The NESS test was first stated in Hart and Honoré (1959) and can be traced back to J.S. Mill. The NESS test was also formulated by Mackie (1965 Mackie ( , 1974 , in terms of INUS conditions: 'an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result'. Note that Mackie's (1965) original formulation was more restrictive than the NESS test as discussed in Wright (1988) because it contained a condition that ruled out causal overdetermination (condition 4), which he later dropped (Mackie 1974) . For a critique of the NESS test as an account of causality, see Cane (2002) . Halpern and Pearl (2005) provides a fully fledged, formal structure of the NESS test that takes into account some of the problems that the NESS test faces. We do not need the apparatus here, however.
16 Sometimes the NESS test is restricted by imposing the additional requirement that the sufficient sets must always be minimally sufficient (see Mackie (1965 Mackie ( , 1974 , Wright (1988) , and Halpern and Pearl (2005) ). We do not use this strengthened version, however, because it suffers from a number of paradoxical problems, which are discussed in Braham and van Hees (2009) .
17 More examples are discussed in Braham and van Hees (2009). describes the event of the members of T performing the actions described by s T (if T = ∅ we may call s T a non-event). To ease the burden on the reader we shall write s −i or s −T instead of s N −{i} or s N −T , respectively. Given an event s T , s i denotes the strategy of i ∈ T , for event s T , s i is the element played by i ∈ T in s T , etc. Furthermore, we write (s T , s −T ) to denote the play of G that consists of the combination of the (mutually exclusive) events s T and s −T . We let π(s T ) denote the set of outcomes that can result from the event s T :
For any s U and s T , call s U a subevent of s T if U ⊆ T if each member of U adopts the same strategy in s U as in s T . The game-theoretic rendition of the NESS test becomes: Definition 3.3 Given a play s N , individual i makes a causal contribution to A (her actions were a causal factor) if, and only if, there is a subplay s T of s N such that 1. s T is a sufficient condition for A; 2. the subevent s T −{i} is not a sufficient condition for A.
Note that the second clause entails that the individual had an alternative strategy which could have led to a different outcome. If s T −{i} is not sufficient for A, then by definition there is a strategy s i for i and a combination of strategies s −T for the players outside of T such that π(s i , s T −{i} , s −T ) ∈ A. Thus, according to our account, being a causal factor entails the availability of an alternative course of actions which might have avoided the realization of the state of affairs. However, as we shall see in the next section, this kind of alternative possibility alone is inappropriate for constituting moral responsibility.
Before proceeding we need to acknowledge a limitation that arises from our focus on games in normal form. In such games, the NESS test has problems dealing with some types of strategies, viz., those comprising conditional actions. Suppose Bob adopts the strategy of painting his garage door if, and only if, his son does not do so. If we were to model the situation as a normal form game, Bob's strategy would be said to be a NESS condition for having the door painted: any outcome resulting from it would lead, by assumption, to the door being painted. Bob would thus be said to have made a causal contribution to the outcome even when it turns out that he was reading the newspaper as his son painted the door. For cases in which such conditional strategies exist, we should apply the NESS test to the underlying games in extensive form, rather than to the game in normal form. We do not go into this issue here and except for our discussion in Section 7 we assume strategies comprise non-conditional actions only. 18 We do not want to use different notations for the outcome x and the state of affairs consisting of the set of which x is the only element and we shall therefore write π(sT ) = x rather than π(sT ) = {x}.
The Avoidance Potential
The demand that the person could have done otherwise has two components. The first is feasibility. Since the outcome of a game depends on the actions of various individuals, we should take account of the actions of the others when examining the possible consequences of the adoption of an alternative strategy. In fact, we should not only consider what could have happened given the strategies others actually adopted but, as intimated earlier, we need to also consider the outcome given the actions they might have adopted.
To pinpoint this feasibility requirement, we examine for each strategy what we call its avoidance potential. As explained in Section 2, we assume the existence of a family of probability distributions over each play of the game and its subgames. These probabilities are used to define a strategy's avoidance potential. To do so we have to introduce some extra notation.
For any game G and any i, let p(s −i | s i ) denote the probability of the others playing s −i if i were to adopt s i , assuming for any actual play s N of it, we always had p(s −i | s i ) > 0 for all i. Furthermore, let h(A, s i ) denote the set of strategy combinations s −i such that i is not causally effective for the realization of A in (s i , s −i ). We now have:
Definition 4.1 The avoidance potential, ρ i (s i , A), of a strategy s i ∈ S i for a state of affairs A, equals
The avoidance potential should not be confused with the idea of control over outcomes (such as in van Inwagen's (1978) 'Principle of Possible Prevention'). What is crucial to the avoidance potential of a strategy is that we do not examine whether the strategy may yield a state of affairs different from A but whether it fails to be a causal factor (by the NESS test) in the realization of A. This distinction is important because our definition of avoidance potential merely cuts the causal connection between the strategy and the outcome, while the stronger condition of 'control' would establish a causal link to an alternative outcome.
To get to grips with the avoidance potential, consider the canonical game of Two Assassins. Two assassins are in place as snipers and at the same point in time they will have to decide whether or not to shoot at Victim. Suppose Assassin 1 has a strict preference for shooting Victim himself, even when Assassin 2 also shoots. As it happens both do indeed shoot simultaneously and the bullets from both assassins fatally pierce Victim's heart at exactly the same moment. Given his strict preference, and since he is assumed to be a utilitymaximizer, Assassin 1 will have shot Victim regardless of Assassin 2's presence -he has a strictly dominant strategy. Is Assassin 2 responsible for Victim's death? Just like Assassin 1, he is causally effective for it by way of the NESS test. The fact that, given Assassin 1's preferences, he had no course of action open to him that would have led to a different outcome does not vitiate his responsibility. The crucial point is that he could have avoided being a causal factor for the realization of x: if he had not shot, he would not have been causally effective. It is important to note -although this is a trivial point -that it is only the alternative actions of the others for which we take feasibility to be relevant; a person's own alternative actions need not concern us. To illustrate, suppose Assassin 2 also had a strictly dominant strategy for killing Victim. In this case there was only one feasible outcome, to wit, the one where he shoots Victim as well. Clearly, we do not let him off the hook just because shooting was his only utility maximizing action; indeed, it would be a strange theory of moral responsibility that would do so.
The notion of the avoidance potential adds precision to the very basic idea that a person is morally responsible for the realization of some state of affairs A if he was causally effective for A and if there were grounds to demand that she done otherwise. These grounds being the performance of a strategy that had a higher avoidance potential for A. More precision is needed, however. The second aspect of the idea of having an alternative option is that the option forms a reasonable opportunity, i.e., it is reasonable to demand that the person performed it.
Suppose a car jacker threatens a driver with his life if he does not hand over the car, which, the car jacker states, will be used for a bank robbery. In face of the threat the driver surrenders his car and, it turns out later, the car is indeed used as the getaway car in a successful bank robbery. Even though the avoidance potential for the bank robbery is lower for the strategy of not giving the man his car, we do not want to hold the car owner responsible for the bank robbery -given that his life was at risk, it would not have been reasonable to demand that he try to resist the car jacker. Similarly, and less grimly, we want to be able to distinguish between criticising someone causing pollution by taking Sunday pleasure drives -'don't be a spoilsport, I'm having such fun' -and someone causing the same amount of pollution by driving someone to a hospital -'don't be ridiculous, my wife was in labour'.
The avoidance potential thus needs to be refined in a specific way. The alternative strategies that make up the potential should be 'eligible' or 'acceptable' according to some standard. We use the term eligibility, which we take from the freedom literature. This notion, which was introduced by Benn and Weinstein (1971) and later discussed by Day (1977) , Jones and Sugden (1982) , and Sugden (1998) , is that when we evaluate a person's freedom to do something we generally have to make some restrictions about what these 'things' or 'doings' are. Assuming, for our purposes, a conception of freedom in which freedom consists of the possibility that an agent performs some action or actions of various kinds, we may be faced with all sorts of possibilities. There are opportunities, however, that do not appear relevant to the assessment of our freedom. Cutting off our ears is an example, the reason, in Benn and Weinstein's (1971: 195) opinion, being that it 'is not the sort of thing anyone, in a standard range of conditions, would reasonably do, i.e., "no one in his senses would think of doing such a things" (even though some people have, in fact, done it)'.
The nub of the matter is that, in this view, the presence of an ineligible opportunity to do something cannot be said to be a relevant freedom affecting our responsibility. 19 In the same way as an ineligible opportunity should not be considered to have a substantial effect on our freedom, the availability of an ineligible strategy should not be considered to affect our responsibility. A demand that we should have behaved otherwise than we did, in the sense that we should have performed some alternative action, is reasonable if the action in question is eligible. A person is to be excused for the realization of some bad outcome, or does not deserve praise for a good one, if its avoidance was only feasible by the adoption of an ineligible strategy. This general idea has found a variety of expressions. Fischer and Ravizza (1998) state that a person is morally responsible for some outcome if they can recognise that there are sufficient reasons to have done otherwise. 20 Wallace (1994: 7) states that moral responsibility requires 'the power to grasp moral reasons, and the power to control one's behaviour in the light of such reasons'. We shall simply presuppose the existence of some theory about what it means to have an eligible alternative and give the conception formal content as follows: for each individual i, eligibility is represented by a mapping E i that assigns to each contingency s −i a subset of the individual's strategies which, given those actions of the others, are eligible. Note that eligibility is taken to be a context-dependent notion. If the N − i players, for instance, perform actions that would result in serious wrongdoing unless i tells a lie, then the act of lying may well be eligible even though in other circumstances (i.e. if the actions of other agents could not result in wrongdoing) it may not be. As we are not interested here in fleshing out a normative theory (the substance of 'reasonable alternatives'), but only in investigating structural features -the anatomy -of a particular form of moral responsibility in games, we refrain from any further exploration of the nature of these eligibility functions. 21
Conditions for Moral Responsibility
We have now reached the stage where it is possible to give a crisp account of our method for assigning moral responsibility. It consists of two formal conditions that together are necessary and sufficient for selecting the set of individuals who are legitimate objects of all that goes along with the attribute 'morally responsible': blame or praise, negative or positive sanctions, and criticism. 22 Call a 'responsibility game' a triple (G, Γ, E), where G is a game, Γ the family of probability functions (one for each strategy of each individual) associated with a particular 19 This does not deny that it is in fact a freedom in the sense of purely unconstrained opportunity and that it may valuable to have such freedoms. For this, see Carter (1999) . 20 Fischer and Ravizza call this 'reasons-responsiveness' and it comes in a weak and strong form. A similar idea is suggested by Nozick (1981: 317-362) .
21 See van Hees (2008) for a recent analysis of such functions in the context of assessing the value of our freedom of choice.
22 As explained in the introduction, we restrict ourselves to situations in which agents have complete information and where their decision making always displays the appropriate volitional quality. It is with this restriction in place that we claim the two conditions are necessary and sufficient, and not merely necessary.
solution concept, and E a set of individual eligibility functions (one for each individual).
Definition 5.1 In a play (s i , s −i ) of a responsibility game (G, Γ, E) an individual i is morally responsible for a state of affairs A if and only if:
1. s i was a causal factor for the realization of A; 2. there is some
The definition is general in that it accounts for the ascription of moral responsibility in oneor n-player normal form games of complete information. Except for the conditional strategies discussed in Section 3, the analysis is suitable for a very broad class of collective action: most social dilemmas in which assignments of responsibility are clearly relevant (collective action problems) can be modelled in the normal form, as can most types of voting.
The definition is a 'result' in itself because it provides a clear set of variables and a relation between these variables for discussing moral responsibility. That is, the definition informs us about the data and base-relations for which we have to account before we can legitimately pass judgement on a person's behaviour with respect to some outcome. Many of the classic examples that are discussed in the modern literature on moral responsibility do not actually take account of the full range of variables that we have introduced in our definition. So, for instance, none of the examples that are discussed in either Fischer and Ravizza (1998) or Sartorio (2007) explicitly mention preferences and solution concepts; and while these are mentioned in Johnson (2003) and Sen (1974) , their discussions are basically restricted to eligibility considerations. Similarly, while Goldman's (1999) responsibility-based solution to the 'paradox of voting' (it is not rational to do so) is close to our definition because it is based on the NESS test, it does not take feasibility restrictions into account. 23 It is also worth noting that the definition is silent about socially optimal states of affairs. No necessary burden is placed on a player to choose the socially optimal outcome (by some standard) and then hold the player responsible for its non-occurrence if they happen to have chosen a strategy leading to a sub-optimal outcome.
To avoid any misunderstanding, although the second clause contains a quantifier we do not impute amounts of responsibility to the players. We have not taken a stand on whether whether moral responsibility can be quantified or distributed in some particular way, and nor will we do so here. At best we can say that, when the conditions are fulfilled, an agent is said to bear some responsibility for the realization of the state of affairs in question. 24 Quantification is a task that reaches beyond the scope of this paper, although admittedly the notion of a strategy's avoidance potential does provide a very natural basis for such quantifications. 25 Finally, we note that the definition has both descriptive and normative content. On the one hand we claim that any definition of moral responsibility that connects outcomes to individuals will, one way or another, take this form. That is, any ascription of this form of responsibility will refer to a game, the solution concepts (standards of behaviour), a causal condition, an eligibility function, and the avoidance potential. On the other hand, the definition can be taken as normative: any definition of moral responsibility ought to take this form, i.e., our constructive exercise demonstrates the proper way to make such ascriptions.
Many Hands and No Hands
We now turn to an application of the machinery. We first consider the prominent case of the 'Tragedy of the Commons' (Hardin 1968 ) that we referred to at the start or, more generally, any collective action situation that can be modelled in this framework (global warming, depletion of fish stocks, production of public goods, volunteering). To analyze whom is to be held responsible for the depletion of the commons we could decide to present the game in detail, state the solution concept and corresponding probability functions, define the appropriate eligibility mappings, and subsequently check whether our conditions for assigning responsibility are satisfied. For our purposes it suffices, however, to restrict ourselves to two characteristics that all such situations have in common. First, we note that each individual i has a strictly dominant strategy s * i : bringing additional livestock to the commons. Furthermore, each individual i has at least one strategy, s i , such that in the play (s i , s * −i ):
1. i would not be causally effective for depletion, and 2. s i is eligible.
The strategy s i is usually some sort of restriction on the part of the player, such as a restriction of the number of livestock a farmer brings to the commons, a reduction of one's 'carbon footprint' activities, etc. Note that it is only assumed that each individual has some such 'restricting strategy'; they may in fact have more. It is also important to point out that not all types of restrictions need be eligible: if not sending any of his livestock to the commons means that a farmer and his family will starve to death for lack of income or food, then it is not reasonable to demand that he do so. We only assume that some strategy of restricting oneself is eligible. First of all, it is not difficult to show that at least some individual can be ascribed moral responsibility. The proof is straightforward. First we show that some individual causally contributed to the depletion. Let T be a subset of N such that the play s * T leads to an outcome in A, that is, to depletion. Clearly there is at least one such T , viz. N itself. Now let T be a smallest subset of T for which this is true, that is, T is a group of farmers whose unrestricted grazing policy is 'minimally sufficient' for depletion of the common land. Then, by the NESS test, each member of T has indeed played a causal role in depleting the common land. By the second characteristic, each member of T has one eligible strategy s i , the avoidance potential of which is 1: since each individual has a strictly dominant strategy, there is only one feasible contingency, s * −i , and i would not make a causal contribution to A in the play (s i , s * −i). Since, as we have shown, i does do so in the actual play, the avoidance potential of his actual strategy is 0. Clearly, this holds for every member of T and we can infer that all the members of T are responsible for the realization of A -they had reasonable opportunity to do otherwise. Because T cannot be empty, at least one individual is indeed responsible. Secondly, if we now make the extra -and often implicit -assumption that each of the individuals made a causal contribution, then we can conclude that each individual is to be held responsible.
We see that an excuse of the form 'given that I could reasonably -and correctly -have expected each of the other agents to play their dominant strategy I cannot be blamed for doing so too because my contribution to the depletion of the resource would not have any noticeable effect' will not pass. In other words, a failure of collective action does not have a moral correlate in the form of a failure of individual responsibility, as Hardin (1988: 156-7) appears to suggest. And thus in contrast to, say, Johnson (2003) and Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) , our framework will assign responsibility for global warming and its manifold effects from frivolous polluting activities.
Our second application concerns the recent argument put forward by Pettit (2007) in which he claims that situations exist in which a collective can be held responsible for its actions, even though none of its members can. 26 He makes use of the so-called Discursive Dilemma to generate this result. This is a situation in which members of a committee have to make a decision about the enactment of a specific policy. In Pettit's example, the committee consists of co-workers who have to decide whether they agree with a pay sacrifice to be used for buying and installing a work floor safety device. Rather than putting that decision directly to a vote, the committee rules specify that the decision will be taken if, and only if, the committee comes to a positive verdict on three issues: whether there is a real danger, whether the safety device is effective, and whether the pay sacrifice is bearable. Furthermore, the rules specify that a vote will be taken on each of the three issues separately and that each issue is decided by majority vote. To simplify matters, assume, as Pettit does, that the committee consists of three members. Table 1 describes their views on the three issues as well as whether the pay sacrifice is indeed justified. Each individual is thus opposed to the pay sacrifice, but for different reasons: A does not believe the salary cut is reasonable, B does not think the device is effective, and C does not believe there is a real danger. However, a vote is taken on each of those issues rather than on the question of whether the pay sacrifice should go through. Since a majority exists for each of the issues, the outcome is that the mechanism is installed and the wages cut. However, none of the members thinks the pay sacrifice is justified. Can they then be held responsible for the outcome? Consider Pettit's position on the matter: 27
But suppose now that some external parties have a complaint against the group, say, the spouses of the less-well-off workers, who think the pay sacrifice unfair. Whom, if anyone, can they hold responsible and blame for the line taken? Whom can they remonstrate with? Not the individuals in their personal right, since each can point out, the chair included, that he or she was actually against the pay sacrifice and that they were not in a position, as well they may not have been, to see the likely effect of the procedure they followed. The spouses in this example can only blame the corporate group as a whole.
We will set aside Pettit's claim about the status of groups and whether or not they are apposite agents of a responsibility ascription, because our concern is only whether or not his claim holds with respect to the individual members. To test his claim we again need not introduce the exact details of the game to come to a conclusion. It is easy to see that, by voting as they did, each individual made a causal contribution to the outcome. We thus need to focus only on the avoidance potential of the various strategies of the individuals. Of crucial importance here is whether it is eligible not to express one's true beliefs about the issues, as when they vote strategically. Now, if strategic voting is not eligible, then by Definition 5.1 it is true that none of the individuals is to be held responsible -after all, no individual then has an alternative strategy which is eligible, and thus also does not have an eligible strategy with a higher avoidance potential. So, in that case, Pettit's claim holds.
On the other hand, if it is eligible to misrepresent one's true beliefs, then all individuals are responsible for the outcome that emerged: by voting 'no' on all issues they could have ensured they would never be the causal factor for a decision in favour of the loss of wages. So, in that case, there is no responsibility gap. Pettit's silence on the whole eligibility issue is notable. He only goes as far as to say that he assumes that the members 'vote as they judge', i.e., they represent their opinions sincerely, but without making any normative commitment in this regard. In which case Pettit's claim does not go through, not because he is wrong but because he has not specified all of the relevant aspects of the situation. The proof of the existence of a 'responsibility gap' requires more structure than that provided by Table 1 , in particular we need information about the eligibility of alternative courses of action. 28 Whether or not a misrepresentation of one's beliefs or convictions is eligible may depend on a variety of factors. For instance, if a player would personally consider it a form of immoral behaviour we may not want to demand that she do so. It may also depend on the nature of the issue under consideration. In the Discursive Dilemma the issues about which a decision has to be made involve beliefs about the world. In such epistemic contexts we may be more reluctant to say that strategic behaviour is eligible, especially if the members of the committee have been chosen because they are supposed to be experts on the factual matters being considered. However, in situations in which the disagreements involves values or interests, strategic behaviour may well be eligible -say when we do not vote for our most preferred candidate because we judge that he is less likely to be chosen anyhow. 29
Frankfurt and Alternative Possibilities
As discussed in the introduction, the intuitions underlying the two conditions that we associate with the folk ethical view of moral responsibility, and which we take to be the kernel of our theory of moral responsibility, have not been undisputed. In particular, Frankfurt famously argued against the idea that the existence of alternative possibilities is a prerequisite for the assignment of responsibility. In the example that Frankfurt used to argue for this, an agent, Black, wants another agent, Jones, to perform a certain action a leading to a particular outcome x. Black has some way of manipulating Jones's decision such that if Jones were to decide not to perform the action, Black could intervene so that Jones would perform the action after all. As it happens, Jones, for reasons of his own, does a and x is realized without Black having to interfere at all. Clearly, we hold Jones responsible for the outcome. Yet he did not seem to have any opportunity to realize a different outcome: given Black's decision to interfere if Jones did not choose to do a, x would have resulted in any case.
Applying our framework to the scenario seems problematic for two reasons. First, we 28 The same conclusion holds for Copp's (2006) analysis of moral responsibility in the Discursive Dilemma. We cannot comment on Chapman's (2009) because he is concerned with legal rather than moral responsibility so that Definition 5.1 may no longer be appropriate.
29 Dowding and Hees (2007) have argued that in such cases strategic behaviour is in fact a virtue.
have restricted ourselves to settings of complete information, whereas in the usual reading of Frankfurt's scenario one of the agents does not have full information: Jones does not know that Black can interfere with his decision making. However, nothing withholds us from presupposing that he does have this information, that is, that the game is one of complete information. A second possible complication is the one we mentioned in Section 3, which is that our game-theoretic account of causation only works for strategies that are non-conditionalif a strategy has a conditional nature, the application of the NESS test may yield counterintuitive results. Black's option of interfering if Jones were to decide not to perform a is, however, a conditional strategy. Fortunately, we can ignore this complication as well because it only relates to the application of the NESS test to Black's actions; it does not affect the analysis of Jones's causal contribution. Yet it is Jones's situation that we want to analyze in terms of the avoidance condition.
To model the situation game-theoretically we need to describe the strategies of Black and Jones. Black's strategies are clear. We can take him either to adopt the conditional strategy of interfering (denoted by t 1 ) or the unconditional one of not doing anything (t 2 ). With respect to Jones's strategy set, things are more complicated. One of his strategies (denoted by s 1 ) is the performance of a -that much is clear. However, since Black can intervene if Jones were not to intend to do a, we should describe his second strategy (s 2 ) as the action of deciding (or intending, trying) to do a. This yields To assess Jones's responsibility in (s 1 , t 1 ), which is the way the game is played in the narrative, we assume that adopting s 2 would have been an eligible strategy for Jones. By assumption, Jones's actual strategy s 1 (doing a) is a sufficient condition for the realization of x, whereas s 2 (deciding or intending not to do a) is not. Hence, application of the NESS test shows that Jones makes a causal contribution to x. Furthermore, in any of the plays in which he decides not to do a, he does not make a causal contribution to the realization of x -either because x is not realized (Black does not interfere) or because x is realized (Black intervenes) but Jones's strategy fails to pass the NESS test. 31 This means that the strategy of deciding not to perform a does have a higher avoidance potential for x than his other strategy.
Our analysis supports Frankfurt's conclusion that a person can be morally responsible for the realization of a state of affairs, even if he did not have a course of action that would have led to a different outcome. However, our explanation for this is entirely different from Frankfurt's. On our account, Jones is to be held responsible for the realization of x because he made a causal contribution and because he did have sufficient avoidance potential.
The analysis can also be formulated in terms of so-called 'flickers of freedom'. Such 'flickers' have been discussed as a possible counterargument to Frankfurt's. According to the argument the option of deciding (intending, trying) not to do a forms an alternative option ('a flicker of freedom') for the agent and the agent therefore does have a genuine alternative. The argument has been contested on various grounds. 32 It is not our aim here to try to defend the argument in the light of these criticisms but we do note that our analysis solves one problem associated with it. The problem is that it is not clear why the presence of an alternative action (the 'flicker') would make a moral difference if the same outcome materializes in any case. Our solution is straightforward: one is responsible for some outcome if one made a causal contribution to it and if one had the possibility of choosing a course of action that had a lower probability of leading to a situation in which one makes such a causal contribution. It is the existence of that possibility which generates moral responsibility.
Conclusion
We shall not recapitulate the outlines of the paper, but rather conclude with two remarks. The first concerns our methodology and the complex nature of the conditions we present. Our necessary and sufficient conditions for ascribing moral responsibility are informationally demanding. It could be argued that this is an argument against our framework. After all, can we really expect individuals to go through the complicated process of establishing all of the ingredients of the game they are in, examine the various causal relations, check the eligibility of their actions, and do the calculations about the avoidance potential of each of their strategies? The question becomes even more pressing when we consider the fact that we have restricted ourselves to settings of complete information. Obviously, this limits the scope of our analysis considerably and a natural next step is to extend the account to situations of incomplete and asymmetric information. However much this may increase the verisimilitude of description, it will in all probability make our account even more complicated and the assignment of responsibility more difficult.
However, we do not think that the complex nature of the analysis is a valid criticism. As stated, we claim to have arrived at the underlying structure of our thinking about an important form of moral responsibility. Hence the title of this paper. The structure is indeed complex, but in discussing the paradigmatic cases of Sections 6 and 7 we have demonstrated that it is not necessary to assume that each and every part of it is always invoked when people actually make judgements about who is, and who is not, responsible for some state of affairs; we did not need all the information about all aspects of the game to arrive at a conclusion. More importantly, we can counter with the argument that people use 'moral heuristics' in the sense of Appiah (2008) , i.e., devices through which we arrive at a conclusion that in most of the relevant cases coincides with the one following from a full-fledged analysis of the situation. There is no reason to think our refined definition of moral responsibility (Definition 5.1) will deviate from these heuristics.
Indeed -and now we turn to our second remark -one example of a moral heuristic that approximates our approach, although not the result, is a widely discussed and controversial principle put forward by Singer (1972) . In his argument for the claim that we have an obligation to alleviate extreme poverty, Singer stated that 'if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it'. 33 Clearly, this principle is about our moral duties rather than about our (retrospective) moral responsibility. It is about what we ought doalleviate the plight of people living in destitution -and not about whether we are accountable for the fact that people live in poverty. Though we have presented our account as describing an important part of much of our practice of assigning moral responsibility, we also believe that it describes the conditions under which assignments of moral responsibility are justified. That is, we not only take it that to be responsible for a bad outcome means that one could have performed an action that had a higher avoidance potential and that was eligible, but also that one should have done so. In this sense, our analysis goes beyond a description of our current practices and presupposes a general principle about what our moral duties are.
In this interpretation, there is an obvious relation between this general principle underlying our account of responsibility and the principle formulated by Singer. Both invoke a restrictive clause -we say the action should be eligible, whereas Singer states it should not sacrifice anything of comparable moral worth -and both refer to the necessity of avoiding the bad outcome -we do so in terms of a strategy's avoidance potential, Singer in terms of possible prevention. As we have argued, one may be held responsible for some outcome without having had the power to actually prevent it. This means that if there is a close relation between moral responsibility and our moral obligations, then our account of moral responsibility presupposes a view of moral duties that in some respects is even stronger than Singer's. Our 'avoidance potential' is not only a descriptive device but a normative one; for the problem of poverty, the avoidance potential implies that we have a moral obligation to sever the ties between our behaviour and the causes of poverty, which is a rather demanding obligation indeed.
